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LEGAL ASPECTS OF RATE BASE AND
RATE OF RETURN IN PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION
FRANCIS JOSEPH DEMIET* & MARGADETTE MOFFATT DEmET**
INTRODUCTION
The terms rate base and rate of return as used in public utility
regulation engender so many diverse considerations and may be viewed
from the vantage point of the accountant, the economist, the lawyer,
the engineer, the utility management, the investor, the consuming pub-
lic, and many others.
To simplify our task and to develop more fully the legal considera-
tions in which we have an especial interest we have confined ourselves
accordingly. We do not wish to detract in any way from the other
manifold aspects but we shall emphasize throughout the legal principles
as they have been developed by our courts over the past seventy-five
years, and as we hope they shall develop in the era just ahead. Such
other considerations as we have taken up are incidental and supple-
mental thereto.
In definition, the following may prove helpful:
Rate base as herein referred to is the valuation placed on utility
property for purposes of arriving at a fair return.
Rate of return is the percentage of return allowed to a given utility
and its investors over and above allowable deductions from gross
income.
Reproduction cost or current fair value is the value of the utility's
property less depreciation as of the date of a utility rate proceeding.
Net investment cost is the actual original cost of utility property
less depreciation.
The cases in this field are without number. From the extensive
reading we have done in the field we have selected those we believe
to be of special significance locally and nationally in the development
of the legal concepts of rate base and rate of return.
Ever since the United States Supreme Court in the famous land-
mark case of Munn v. Illinois' in 1877 placed the seal of its approval
upon a statute fixing public utility rates and Chief Jutice Waite traced
its authority back to the Lord Chief Justice Hale over three centuries
before, 2 the courts of this country have without exception recognized
*B.A. Loras College, LL.B. Georgetown University.
**B.A. College of St. Francis, LL.B. Marquette University.
I Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
2 De Portibus Maris, 1 HARG. L. TR. 78.
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the need for state regulation of the rates of public utilities. But just
what that regulation should consist of and by whom the regulating
should be done was to present many problems both from the standpoint
of the industry and the governmental bodies that became involved.
The United States Supreme Court in the Munn case upheld the
right of Illinois to pass a law regulating grain elevators under its police
power, thus establishing the constitutionality of such laws. It also ruled
that rate control was a legislative function and that recourse against
abuses must be political and not judicial. It soon became apparent,
however, that the legislature was not the proper body to exercise such
control and in 1890 the United States Supreme Court handed down a
decision in Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minne-
sota,3 in which the court reversed itself completely and stated that the
reasonableness of a rate was subject to judicial review. This was the
beginning of a long period in which the courts were strongly concerned
with the economic aspects of public utility regulation.
In 1898 in the decision Smyth v. Ames 4 the United States Supreme
Court for the first time seemed to emphasize the necessity of a so-
called "rate base." The many factors to be considered in evaluating a
public utility so as to yield a fair return on fair value of utility prop-
erty were set forth in some detail. The settled principles in Smyth ,.
Ames were as follows:
1. A railroad corporation is a person within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment declaring that no state shall
deprive any person of property without due process of law,
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection
of the laws.
2. A state enactment, all regulations made under the au-
thority of a state enactment, establishing rates for the trans-
portation of persons or property by railroad that will not admit
of the carrier exacting such compensation as under all circum-
stances is just to it and to the public, would deprive such carrier
of its property without due process of law, and deny to it the
equal protection of the laws and would therefore, be repugnant
to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.
3. While rates for the transportation of persons and prop-
erty within the limits of a state are primarily for its determina-
tion, the question whether they are so unreasonably low as to
deprive the carrier of its property without such compensation
as the Constitution secures, and therefore, without due process
of law, cannot be so conclusively determined by the legislature
of the state, or by regulations adopted under its authority, that
the matter may not become the subject of judicial inquiry.5
3 134 U.S. 418 (1890).




It was recognized further that regulation was a complicated process
and not subject to any simple formula and the court pointed out that
trained commission staffs would be needed to understand and admin-
ister it.
There has been much discussion as to the actual effect of the Smyth
case. It can be generally said, however, that it marked the beginning
of the theory of rate base and appeared to favor strong consideration
of "reproduction value" of facilities in arriving at rate base. The prob-
able reasoning behind the choice of reproduction cost was a considera-
tion which first led our courts to regulate utilities. Regulation is a
substitute for the valid and beneficial effects of competition. Com-
petition among public utilities had proved costly and unsatisfactory to
the consumer and utility alike and hence had to be eliminated but its
salutary effects compensated for. To place utilities on a fair basis
with other industries, the court in Smyth v. Ames reasoned, its prop-
erty should be valued in a like manner at current cost. It should be
noted that this decision coincided with a time of cyclical depression
and for that reason was particularly advantageous to consumers and
entirely acceptable to commissions although the valuation from the
company's standpoint was lower than actual original cost of invest-
ment. The reproduction theory continued to be favored by the courts
in most jurisdictions for a period of approximately fifty years. We
shall note, however, certain decisions during that period which were
of great importance both locally and nationally.
Despite the Smyth decision and subsequent decisions in other juris-
dictions the Wisconsin Public Service Commission as early as 1923
espoused the investment cost method of establishing rate base., Under
this method the original cost of plant and plant additions less depreci-
ation is the rate base used.
In 1924 the Wisconsin Supreme Court became the first jurisdiction
to advance the so-called "end result theory" which was to develop into
a source of controversy almost twenty years later.7 In that case the
court stated that "It is not its method that is to be reviewed but the
result reached by the commission." It stated further that under the
Wisconsin Statutes" the commission was charged with the duty of
ascertaining and declaring a reasonable rate; if that is done, the method
by which the commission arrives at its result is "not subject to criticism."
Under this view review by the courts should only take place where
there has been such an obvious abuse of discretion by the commission
6 Waukesha Gas Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, 181 Wis. 281, 301, 194
N.W. 846 (1923).
7 Wisconsin-Minnesota Light and Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 183
Wis. 96, 99, 197 N.W. 359 (1924).
s Wis. STATS. §§196.03 and 196.37 (1957).
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that the constitutional property rights of the utility have been jeo-
pardized.
In 1923, the United States Supreme Court handed down another
decision which was to become important in determining rate of re-
turn.9 The court therein warned against speculative profits but found
that a utility was entitled to a rate permitting to its investors earnings
equal to those actually being made at the same time and in the same
general part of the country on investments in other business under-
takings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties.
Judicial recognition was given to the fact that utilities must compete
for capital in the same market as unregulated industries. The court
said further that the return should be sufficient to insure confidence
in the financial soundness of the utility and pointed out that reason-
ableness of a rate of return would change as changes occurred in in-
vestment opportunities, the money market, and general business con-
ditions.
The United States Supreme Court in McCardle v. Indianapolis
Water Co.'0 during a period of inflationary prices laid down the rule
which had the effect of requiring commissions to consider reproduction
value in arriving at a proper rate of return and the rule of the Smyth
case became mandatory.
Based upon this decision our own Wisconsin Supreme Court modi-
fied the Wisconsin rule to conform thereto and to "give due considera-
tion to " cost of reproduction new less depreciation because of the
apparent constitutional requirement."
In a subsequent case, Pabst Corporation v. Railroad Commission,12
the Wisconsin Supreme Court ameliorated the reproduction cost theory
of rate base espoused in the Waukesha Gas and Electric Co. v. Rail-
road Commission case.' 3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in the
Pabst case that two factors are to be considered by the commission in
determining a rate base, to wit: present day reproduction costs and
prudent investment.
In 1933 and the early years of the depression, a doctrine found its
way into the United States Supreme Court rulings which was new
to all but the Wisconsin Supreme Court.' 4 In Los Angeles Gas and
Electric Corp. v. California Railroad Commission,' the Supreme Court
held that where a utility could not prove confiscation of its property,
9 Bluefield Waterworks and Improvement Co. v. West Virginia Public Serv-
ice Commission, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
'
0 McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1927).
11 Waukesha Gas and Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, 191 Wis. 565, 211
N.W. 760 (1927).
"2199 Wis. 536, 227 N.W. 18 (1929).
13 Supra note 11.
14Wisconsin-Minnesota Light and Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra
note 7.
15 289 U.S. 287 (1933).
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the procedure and method of determining reasonable rates should be
within the commission's jurisdiction. The "shackles of the rule of
Smyth v. Ames" were discarded and the highest court of the land went
on record as stating that only in cases of obvious injustice would the
court interfere with the rulings of regulatory bodies. Gradually the
close rein which the courts had held on utility regulation since 1890
was loosening.
The period of the 1930's was a very difficult one for public utili-
ties. They were faced for the first time with serious federal competi-
tion in many fields and they were regulated in the strictest fashion in
their history. The case of Federal Power Commission v. Natural Pipe-
line Co. of America decided in 1942,16 was a good indication of the
change in thinking relative to valuation of utility property for rate
making purposes. Smyth v. Ames was not overruled entirely but
stress was laid to the precept that commissions were not bound to any
one formula in arriving at the result of a fair return. It was left for
the decision of the Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas
Co. in 1944,17 to overturn judicial precedence in the rate making field.
Whether or not the Hope case actually "laid the ghost" of the Smyth
case is a question which has been argued by authorities in the field
for years. It certainly started the chain reaction which is still being
felt in the field of utility regulation. The Supreme Court in the Hope
case did not approve any particular method of rate base determination
but said in effect that the end result and not the method by which the
result was arrived at was of utmost importance. This decision was to
be roundly criticized by many eminent jurists, among them Justice
Jackson who said in a separate opinion in the same case that if the
court were to hold a given rate reasonable just because the commission
had called it reasonable, review becomes "a costly time-consuming
pageant of no particular value." ' justice Jackson stated further that
We need not be slaves to a formula but unless we can point
out a rational way of reaching conclusions, the conclusions can
only be accepted as resting on intuition or predilection.
In our own State of Wisconsin the Hope decision was received with
complete accord. On the strength of the Hope decision and its own
prior decision in 1923'9 and the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision
of 1924,20 the Wisconsin Commission in 1947 came out emphatically
favoring the "end result" theory of regulation and rejecting any rate
base. In the case of The Commonwealth Telephone Co., it was stated :21
16 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
27 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
18 Ibid.
29 Waukesha Gas and Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra note 6.20 Wisconsin-Minnesota Light and Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra
note 7.




The rates prescribed are arrived at without determining any
rate base, and without determining any specific figure as con-
stituting a "fair rate of return" on anything that may be claimed
to be a proper rate base.
The Commission merely allowed a return which it felt would be reason-
able and would allow the company a reasonable profit. The Wiscon-
sin Commission's decision was overruled by Judge Reis of the Dane
County Circuit Court in one of the most scathing opinions ever de-
livered by a jurist.22 Judge Reis said in part that the commission
found nothing except that a certain amount of dollars represent a
reasonable profit.
*.. Reasonable profit ON WHAT? That is the trouble with
the commission's decision. It has no bottom. It has a numera-
tor but no denominator. For a long time, Wisconsin believed
in the "prudent investment" theory of rate making. A utility
was entitled to a fair return on the amount of money prudently
invested in the enterprise, it was said. That sounded fair. That
is the universal standard. Every businessman expects to receive
a fair return on the money which he has put into his business
whether he runs a hardware store or an apartment building
or a bowling alley. Our Supreme Court of Wisconsin approved
the prudent investment theory.
Judge Reis went on to comment upon reproduction theory vs. pru-
dent investment theory of rate base. Unlike the Wisconsin Commission
Judge Reis interpreted the Hope decision as indicating that the United
States Supreme Court had rejected the reproduction theory and re-
turned to the prudent investment theory. Apparently many other Com-
missions and jurists interpreted the Hope case as did Judge Reis for
there was a great swing throughout the country to the investment cost
theory in the years immediately following.
In conclusion of his opinion Judge Reis pointed out:
The Public Service Commission's error in the case before
us is its misconstruction of the Hope decision. Somehow or other
our commission gets out of that decision the idea that there
need not be a base rate at all. That sequiter. [It follows] We
just do not follow. The Federal Power Commission in the Hope
case expressedly found a base rate of $33,712,526 and engaged
a fair rate of return at 62 percent. Here were both numerator
and denominator.
23
The opinion of Judge Reis was upheld by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in 1948.24 Speaking for the court Justice Hughes stated that
in fixing rates for the telephone company the Public Service Commis-
22 Commonwealth Telephone Co. v. Wisconsin Public Service Commission, 71
P.U.R. (n.s.) 65 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1947).
23 Ibid.
24 Commonwealth Telephone Co. v. Wisconsin Public Service Commission, 252
Wis. 481, 32 N.W. 2d. 247 (1948).
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sion must file findings of fact embracing the essentials upon which it
bases the reasonableness of its rate order and it must determine and
set forth the relevant facts and circumstances determinative of the
rate base; otherwise its order is arbitrary and unlawful. This opinion
marks the end of the "end result" doctrine in the State of Wisconsin
and it represents the last specific ruling by our Supreme Court on this
subject. It is significant to note that the court said nothing about what
the rate base should consist of beyond the fact that there should be
one and that it should be apparent from the findings of fact.
The Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act requires every de-
cision of an agency in a contested case shall be in writing accompanied
by findings of fact and conclusions of law.25
Prior to the act and to the Hope case the Wisconsin Supreme
Court frequently instructed agencies regarding this requirement and
insisted upon compliance.2 6
Decisions subsequent to the act indicate the Wisconsin Supreme
Court considers the statutory provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act a mandate for well drafted, specific and carefully considered
findings.2
7
Wisconsin was not the only jurisdiction which rejected the "end
result"28 theory as apparently espoused by the Hope case. The Ver-
mont court stated in a 1949 telephone company case that the usual
and reasonable method for a commission to adopt in fixing rates is to
determine a proper rate base and then a proper rate of return.29 It
cited considerable authority on this subject" and pointed out that the
Hope case31 did not change this rule and "... did not reject judicial
right of review as to reasonableness of rates and, obviously, if it be
held that no yardstick is necessary whereby to test this question, then
judicial review as to reasonableness of rates would become utterly
meaningless. ' '32
As we have noted previously the courts in Wisconsin although re-
quiring specific findings of fact in the determination of a rate base and
rate of return have left the actual decision as to what the rate base
2 5 Wis. STAT. §227.13 (1943).
26 Tesch v. Industrial Commission, 200 Wis. 616, 229 N.W. 194 (1930); Wis-
consin L. R. Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Co., 228 Wis. 473, 494, 279 N.W.
673, 117 A.L.R. 398 (1938); Folding Furniture Works v. Wisconsin L.R.
Board, 232 Wis. 170, 180, 285 N.W. 851, 286 N.W. 875 (1939).
27 Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Commission, 248 Wis. 59, 80-81,
21 N.W. 2d. 5 (1945); Commonwealth Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, supra note 24; Motor Transport Co. v. Public Service Commission,
253 Wis. 497, 34 N.W. 2d. 787 (1948) ; Green Bay & W.R. Co. v. Public Serv-
ice Commission, 269 Wis. 178, 68 N.W. 2d. 828 (1955); Bell v. Personnel
Board of Wisconsin, 269 Wis. 602, 49 N.W. 2d. 889 (1951).
28 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 17.29 Re New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 115 Vt. 494, 66 A. 2d 135 (1939).
30 West Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Public Utilities Commission, 294 U.S. 63 (1935).
3 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 17.
32 Re New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra note 29.
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should be in the hands of the commission. In accord with the dicta in
Judge Reis's opinion33 the Wisconsin Public Service Commission re-
garded the Hope case as overruling the requirement of consideration of
reproduction cost as laid down in the McCardle case34 leaving Public
Service Commissions free to return to the investment cost theory. In a
1952 case involving the Wisconsin Telephone Co., the Commission in a
lengthy opinion declined to consider current value in arriving at a
rate base.3 5 In this case the Wisconsin Telephone Co. applied to the
Commission for an investigation of its rates and for an order fixing
reasonable rates. It introduced as a part of its exhibits to the case cer-
tain information concerning the current value of its property. The
Commission reviewed in some detail the history of controversies on
the subject of rate making since the Smyth case36 and referred to the
Hope case37 as follows:
... The Hope case gave recognition to the importance of the
result to be reached, that is the opportunity for a utility to
reasonable profits sufficient to attract capital rather than the
mechanics employed in reaching such results. Commissions were
not bound to a single formula or a combination of formulas.
If a commission can do a good job as well as a quicker and
less expensive one, in a rate case by the adoption of any
method which would retain the fundamentals of fair play, due
process, and provide fair and reasonable results, it is now free
to do so under the Federal Constitution ...
The Commission explained that it did not wish to be arbitrary in
rejecting a current value theory and adhering to the net investment
cost theory. But that it was motivated primarily by pracical considera-
tions. The commission argued that the reproduction cost theory lacks
both definiteness and stability and ". . . The use of current value would
reintroduce the wild uncertainty and recurrent rate controversies
which characterized the reproduction cost era." It stated further that
the reproduction cost standard was so variable that it would never lead
to any type of stability. It quoted an early Wisconsin case38 to the
effect that rates should be permanent as is possible and that frequent
changes are disturbing both to the companies and to their customers.
To this effect it cited also the authority of Justice Brandeis in Missouri
ex. rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company39 and Justice Rosen-
33Commonwealth Telephone Co. v. Wisconsin Public Service Commission (Wis.
Cir. Ct. 1947), supra note 22.34 McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Commission, supra note 10.
35 Complaint of Wisconsin Telephone Company concerning its rates and ap-
plication for an investigation of its rates and for an order fixing reasoable
rates. Docket 2-U-3573, Vol. 37, P.S.C. of W.R. (April 9, 1952).
36 Smyth v. Ames, supra note 4.
37 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 17.
38 Hill v. Antigo Water Co., 3 W.R.C. 623, 639.




berry of our own Supreme Court 0 in justifying its opinion regarding
investment cost as the proper rate base. With respect to reproduction
cost it quoted Justice Rosenberry as follows:
'It is difficult to see why the valuation arrived at by guess on
the basis of estimate should form the legal basis of depriving a
litigant of its property or be the justification for excessive
charges to the public.'4 '
In further justification of the refusal to consider current value or
reproduction cost in determining a rate base the commission said:
During the present period of inflation, the commission is
being urged to consider the rate bases which are geared to the
present purchasing power of the dollar rather than original cost.
While it may be possible to estimate with a considerable degree
of accuracy how much existing plant would cost in terms of
present day dollars, what do you have when you obtain that
amount? It certainly does not represent past dollar invest-
ments; it is claimed that it represents in terms of today's dol-
lars what it would have cost to build the plant as it was built
over a period of many years. While such information is in-
teresting and certainly demonstrates the extent to which the pur-
chasing power of the dollar has declined because of current
inflation, it affords no basis whatsoever for the establishment of
public utility rates .... 42
And later on in its opinion "the commission is willing to go on record
at this time that it will approve any rate of return on a net invest-
ment cost rate base which is deemed necessary to achieve the reason-
able end result required under the Hope case."4 3
This has remained the commission rule to the present date. An-
other 1952 case involving the rates of Wisconsin Electric Power Com-
pany44 quotes extensively from the Telephone Company opinion and
finds an investment cost rate base in spite of the fact that counsel for
the Electric Company had strongly urged the commission to consider
standards of valuation other than investment cost. In answer to com-
pany counsel, and as a preface to what was said in the Telephone
Company opinion, the commission pointed out the following state-
ment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Pabst case 45 decided
in 1929.
. .. Shortly after the commission filed that decision [Pabst
Corp.], this court in Waukesha Gas and Electric, 191 Wis. 565,
4 0 Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 232 Wis. 274, 358,
287 N.W. 122 (1939).41 Complaint of Wis. Tel. Co., supra note 35.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
-4Investigation on Commission's Motion of Electric Rates, Charges, Rules,
Practices, and Operation of Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Docket 2-U-3691,
37 P.S.C. of W.R. 221 (April 25, 1952).
45 Pabst Corp. v. Railroad Commission, supra note 12.
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modified its expressions in the earlier case of Waukesha Gas
and Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, 181 Wis. 281 but did
not intend to withdraw what was said in that case any further
than was necessary to conform to the Federal Rule announced
in McCardle v. Indianapolis W. Co., 272 U.S. 400. So far as
the conclusion in Waukesha Gas and Electric Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 181 Wis. 281, was out of the harmony with that
Federal Rule, it was modified; otherwise the conclusions reached
in that case stand.
The commission concluded that the statement of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in the Pabst case when considered in conjunction with
the other cases cited, effectively refuted the contention of the counsel
for the company that the commission is required by law to give con-
sideration in rate cases to standards of value other than investment
cost.
In a more recent case decided the following year,46 the Wisconsin
Commission exclusively approved net investment cost as a rate base
standard when it said:
This commission approves net investment cost as a rate base
standard. Other standards of value need not be given considera-
tion. Cost of reproduction or trended present-day costs as a
factor in rate regulation was discussed in considerable detail by
this commission in Re Wisconsin Telephone Company, Docket
2-U-3575 (April 9, 1952) (37 PSCW 166), and Re Wisconsin
Electric Power Company, Docket 2-U-3691 (April 25, 1952)
(37 PSCW 216).
In the language of Chief Justice Rosenberry in Wisconsin
Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission, 232 Wis.
274, 355 (1939):
'It is difficult to see why a valuation arrived at by guess on
the basis of estimate should form the legal basis of depriving a
litigant of its property, or be the justification for excessive
charges to the public.'
We have examined carefully and extensively every volume of the
Public Service Commission Reports of Wisconsin and the Public
Utility Reports to determine whether or not the Wisconsin Commis-
sion has deviated at any time from this rule. The cases indicate an
expressed intention on the part of the commission to consider such
factors as cost of money, increased operating costs, need for more
working capital, the problem engendered by regulatory lag (delay
from the time of a company's request for a rate increase until the
Commission reaches a decision), and many other factors, but the
basic premise of investment cost rate base has remained. In a most
recent case of the Wisconsin Telephone Co., 47 in spite of the fact that
46 City of Racine v. Wisconsin Natural Gas Co., 38 P.S.C. of W.R. 314, 2-U-3842
and 2-U-3876 (August 4, 1953) ; see also Re Village of Shorewood, 2-U-4827
(September 12, 1957).
47 Re Wisconsin Telephone Co., Docket 2-U-4904 (April 18, 1958).
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the Wisconsin Telephone Company put in a complete case for repro-
duction value, the commission refused to consider it and found a rate
base as always founded upon investment theory. The commission
did point out, however, that it took into consideration in this case the
new doctrine of attrition. Under this doctrine a certain percentage, is
allocated into the rate to make up for the "regulatory lag" which takes
place between the time that the company applied for an increase in
rates and the time when such increase is granted. This new doctrine
emphasizing the loss in return due to inflationary cost increases oc-
curring after the completion of the rate proceeding was emphasized
this year by a number of commissions in determining their rates, and
each of them allowed higher rates of return upon this basis.48
Since the Hope case a number of commissions have, like Wiscon-
sin, interpreted the Federal Constitution to allow a commission to
choose its own rate base according to what appears to it to be most
fair. In point of fact, a great majority of the commissions switched
after the Hope case from the reproduction theory to the original in-
vestment cost theory as a proper basis for determining a fair rate of
return. Some jurisdictions, of course, continued to adhere to the
current value or reproduction cost theory of the Smyth49 case. Among
these were Illinois. Maine (since changed), Maryland, Minnesota,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Ver-
mont and Washington.50 The pioneer state allowing reproduction
theory and calling for consideration of reproduction value in the
statutes regulating commissions was the state of Ohio and the theory
has apparently worked out in Ohio to the great satisfaction of both
companies and customers. Another early state requiring consideration
of reproduction cost was the state of Maine which in 1957 oddly
48Re Southern California Gas Co. (October 1, 1957) 21 P.U.R. 3d 1; Re
Southern California Edison Co., (October 15, 1957) 21 P.U.R. 3d 15; Re
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., (Kentucky) 18 P.U.R. 3d 113;
Re Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. v. Maryland (Md.) Case No.
537 (February 11, 1958); Re Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. (Neb.) 19
P.U.R. 3d 233; Re New York Telephone Co., (N.Y.) 20 P.U.R. 3d 129; Re
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia (Va.) 23 P.U.R. 3d 239
(December 23, 1957) ; Re Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of West
Virginia, (W. Va.) Case No. 4570 (March 4, 1958); Re: Wisconsin Tele-
phone Co. (Wis.) Docket 2-U-4904 (April 18, 1958); Re Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Co., Docket 4548, order 2719 (April 30, 1958) (Mon-
tana) 23 P.U.R. 3d 252; Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of West
Virginia (1958) 23 P.U.R. 3d 344; attrition denied: Re New England Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. (1958) 23 P.U.R. 3d 510.
49 Smyth v. Ames, supra note 4.
50 Illinois Bell Teleph. Co. v. Commerce Commission (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1953) 98
P.U.R. (n.s.) 379, 11 N.E.2d 329; New England Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission, (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1953) 98 P.U.R. (n.s.)
326, 94 A.2d 801; Chesapeake & P. Teleph. Co. v. Public Service Commission,
(Md. Ct. App. 1952) 97 P.U.R. (n.s.) 50, 93 A.2d 249; Re Minneapolis Street
R. Co., (1949) 228 Minn. 435, 79 P.U.R. (n.s.) 407; Re New Jersey Power
& Light Co., (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1952) 95 P.U.R. (n.s.) 467, 89 A.2d 26; Northern
States Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1944) 73 N.D. 211, 53
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enough repealed the statute which required consideration of reproduc-
tion theory 51
Repeatedly through the years utilities have attempted to empha-
size the inflationary trends since World War II and consequent hard-
ship resulting to them in the commissions' insistence upon use of the
net investment theory. Gradually, perhaps due to commission insistence,
there has been a gradual shift toward reproduction cost in very recent
years. In 1957 although the legislature of the state of Maine repealed
its statute requiring consideration of reproducion cost, two new states,
Iowa 52 and Missouri, 53 shifted to the reproduction cost theory, thus
bringing the total to 17. The Iowa court cited the depreciated dollar
and spiraling costs as its reason for considering new value levels, and
the Missouri court completely reversed its previous reliance on the
Hope case and reversed and remanded an order of the Public Service
Commission based on net investment cost. The court cited inflation
as a major reason for its changed stand.
In another recent case the New York Court of Appeals interpreted
the Public Service Law as requiring the commission to receive evidence
of reproduction cost.5 4 On rehearing the commission received the evi-
dence on reproduction cost but was dissatisfied with it and used in-
vestment cost although it promised to give due consideration to in-
flationary factors and increased cost of capital.55 A 1956 Indiana case
requires consideration of reproduction cost less depreciation in ar-
riving at a fair value determination. 56
Recently commissions in California Florida, Indiana, Missouri,
North Dakota, Wyoming, and West Virginia recognized and cited in-
flationary problems of a utility in grating higher rates of return.57
P.U.R. (n.s.) 143; Marietta v. Public Utilities Commission, (1947) 148 Ohio
St. 173, 71 P.U.R. (N.S.) 186; Pittsburgh v. Public Utility Commission, (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1951) 88 P.U.R. (n.s.) 70; Equitable Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission, (1947) 160 Pa. Super. Ct. 458, 68 P.U.R. (n.s.)
65; Re Northwestern Bell Teleph. Co., (S.D. Sup. Ct. 1950) 85 P.U.R. (n.s.)
368, 43 N.W. 2d 553; Re New England Teleph. & Teleg. Co., (1949) 115 Vt.
494, 79 P.U.R. (n.s.) 508; State v. Pacific Teleph. & Teleg. Co., (1947) 27
Wash. 2d 893, 70 P.U.R (n.s.) 250.
51 Ashby, Keeping Up With Public Utility Rate Regulation, P.U. FORT. 74 (July
1958).
52 Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, 20 P.U.R. 3d 159.
53 Missouri ex rel Missouri Water Co. v. Public Service Commission, 22 P.U.R.
3d 254.5
- New York Teleph. Co. v. New York Public Service Commission, 12 P.U.R.
3d 399.
55 Re New York Teleph. Co., 20 P.U.R. 3d 129.
56 Indiana Public Service Commission v. City of Indianapolis, (1956) 12 P.U.R.
3d 320.
57 Re Empire District Electric Co., (Mo.) (January 24, 1958) 22 P.U.R. 3d 399;
Re Southern California Gas Co., supra note 48; Re New York Telephone Co.,
20 P.U.R. 3d 129; Re Southern California Edison Co., supra note 48; Re
Florida Power and Light Co., (August 22, 1957) 19 P.U.R. 3d 417; Re
Missouri Power and Light Co., (December 17, 1957) 21 P.U.R. 3d 404; Re
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., (Wyo.) (February 28, 1958) 18 P.U.R. 3d 166;
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Interest cost of money commenced an upswing in the year of 1955
reaching an all time 20 year high in November of 1957. A change in
credit policy by the Federal Reserve Board set a decline in cost of
money thereafter to a level approximating cost in the latter part of
1956. The increasing cost of money combined with attrition and in-
flation during 1956 and 1957 caused a steady upward trend in rate
of return.58
The Federal Power Commission has not based many recent de-
cisions on the factors of cost of money, attrition and inflation. In one
recent case5 9 the commission allowed an increased rate of return to a
pipeline company. It is too early to determine at this time what effects
lower cost of money will have on attrition and inflation in the deter-
mination by the various commissions of a higher rate of return in the
future. The West Virginia Commission allowed an increased rate of
return in 1958 even though it took judicial notice of the fact that in-
terest rates had decreased since the time when the hearings were
completed.60
The North Dakota Commission refused a higher rate of return
although the applicant presented evidence of higher interest costs dur-
ing a preceding three and four year period. The commission em-
phasized lower money costs since November of 1957 as a factor in
refusing a higher rate.61 The New Mexico Commission decided that
debt service requirements, providing a reasonable return to its in-
vestors, maintenance of a utility's credit standing and the ability to
attract new capital were factors to be considered in the increase of
rate return.62 Anticipated higher cost of capital was denied considera-
tion in Michigan 3 and Massachusetts 4 during the year.
In the field of economic depreciation the Iowa Supreme Court
stated that the allowance for depreciation as an operating expense
should be based on present reproduction value rather than an original
cost. The court said:65
It would do the utility company no good to set its rates on
the fair present value base if the base is then to be ignored and
the value represented in the base annually eroded away by re-
fusal of adequate depreciation expense allowance.
Re Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of West Virginia, supra note 48;
Re Midwest Telephone Co., Inc., (Ind.) (March 7, 1958) No. 27409, 23 P.U.R.
3d 35; Contra: Riverton Water Co. v. Penn P.U.C., (Pa. Super. Ct.) (March
24, 1958).
5s Supra notes 48 and 57.
59 Re Gulf Interstate Pipeline Co. (F.P.C.) Docket G-12863 (April 11, 1958).
60 Re Hope Natural Gas Company, (April 18, 1958) 23 P.U.R. 3d 394.
61 Re Montana-Dakota Utilities Company, (January 24, 1958) 22 P.U.R. 3d 505.
62Re Lea County Gas Co., (N.M. 1958) 22 P.U.R. 3d 212.
63 Re Michigan Consol. Gas Co., (1958) 22 P.U.R. 3d 369.
64Re New England Teleph. & Tel. Co., (1958) 22 P.U.R. 3d 470.
65 Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, supra note 52, at 190.
1959]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
It is difficult to determine the most appropriate method of arriving
at a proper rate base. The Wisconsin Commission in choosing net in-
vestment cost has stated that it is simpler, less speculative, and does
not leave so many factors open to conjecture. It is further argued
by those opposed to the use of the reproduction cost theory or cur-
rent value theory that even the utilities themselves do not wish to use
it except in times of inflation and that it requires commission staffs
to be so well trained and to engage in long and costly studies which
are not productive either to the utility or to the customer. The use of
book value on the other hand, it is said, gives the commission staff
some definite figure from which to work. The Wisconsin Commission
contends that using this definite investment figure and giving con-
sideration to such other factors as cost of money, attrition, current
operating cost, need of working capital, and other factors, it can arrive
at a fairer base of return for all concerned. It claims that a definite
percentage figure need not govern and that it is willing to allow any
return upon the investment basis which is necessary to satisfy the
other factors under consideration. 6 In actuality the allowed per-
centage has not increased sufficiently to offset these rising cost prob-
lems.
It would seem to us that there is some validity to the contention
that reproduction value is a more difficult basis requiring greater train-
ing as well as greater effort upon the part of commission staffs. Con-
versely, if the commissions are to give sensible consideration to such
concepts as cost of money, need of current working capital, increased
operating expenses, attrition factors, inflation, and so forth, the staff
is still going to have to engage in a very extensive study if it is to
be fair to all concerned. It appears to us, therefore, that whichever
method is chosen the commission must employ or continue to employ
persons who are well trained in accounting and economics, who
recognize the problems of public utilities, and who have the vision to
understand that it is to the benefit of the customer as well as the utility
that the utility be in a healthy financial condition so as to attract
capital and to compete with other businesses for new investors.
It is apparent from our review of the cases that the courts have
generally abdicated their review of commission rulings in the matter
of rate base in the State of Wisconsin and generally throughout the
country except where there is actual confiscation of property. It is
our feeling that the courts have erred in so doing. We do not wish
to minimize the efforts of commissioners themselves nor do we wish
to slur the staff of experts whom they employ but we wish to point
out that public utility rate regulation involves important legal and con-
66 Complaint of Wisconsin Tel. Co., supra note 35.
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stitutional rights. Public utility corporations are individual persons
before the law.
CONCLUSION
We are in an era of dynamic progressivism and prosperity, despite
the present cyclical recession. Commissions and courts in the field of
utility regulation and review have a duty to adopt forvard views,
theories and methods in the formulation of a rate base and rate of
return. The approach and duty is a forward looking, positive one,
rather than backward looking and regressive. We believe the original
investment cost theory of rate regulation to be repressive, regressive
and backward looking. Its use defeats the original purpose of utility
regulation. The original investment cost theory is lacking in vision and
short sighted and can do irreparable harm to the public and the utility
in the future. Utilities must be favored with a climate in which they
can continue to expand, provide adequate service to the public, meet
the problems of progressive inflation, higher cost of money, attrition,
higher cost of doing business, and attraction of capital. Commissions
and courts must be visionary and far sighted in their approach to
these problems so that a utility may be properly equipped to meet these
challenges in the future. We submit the reproduction theory of de-
termination of rate base and rate of return based upon present day
actual value is the best approach to the challenge.
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